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Is normal science good science?1
Introduction
Thomas Kuhn’s idea of normal science aroused controversy and 
discussion on nature of the scientific enterprise.2 Similarly, “good 
science” could be understood in multiple ways, i.e. having “psycho-
logical” qualities, the concept forwarded by Kuhn; or “intellectual” 
qualities, the concept represented by Karl Popper, among others. 
With such an intricate web of concepts, it could be argued that 
there are a few ways of answering the question of whether normal 
science is good science. One way is to examine whether Kuhn’s psy-
chological features of science were advantageous. The criticism of 
Kuhn’s account would imply that good science has other distinctive 
features and that maybe normal science is good in an intellectual, 
but not psychological sense. Consequently, the Popperian account is 
analyzed, together with some criticisms on that account, and a more 
balanced “middle ground” vision of normal science by Feyerabend3 
1 The paper was originally submitted as an assignment for the course Intro-
duction to the History and Philosophy of Science under the supervision of Miss Ra-
chel Dunn at Durham University, UK. It was also awarded with the title of Highly 
Commended at the 2014 competition for undergraduate students, The Undergrad-
uate Awards.
2 Compare e.g. with essays in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Pro-
ceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, ed. I. Laka-
tos, A. Musgrave, London 1965, Cambridge 1970.
3 Compare with P. Feyerabend, Consolations for the Specialist, [in:] Criticism 
and the Growth of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 197–230.
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is presented. This paper aims to show that a clear-cut answer of 
whether normal science is good science seems difficult.
1. Exegesis
Normal science was a concept popularized by Kuhn in his 1962 
book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.4 Normal science took 
place after an establishment of the paradigm, the framework most 
successful in solving the current most important scientific prob-
lems.5 Its goal was the “articulation of […] phenomena and theories 
that the paradigm already supplies”6 and “puzzle-solving”.7 Instead 
of producing major novelties, it aimed at solving problems within 
the paradigm, i.e. problems whose outcome had been assured to 
be found (indicated by the existence of the general paradigm), 
similarly like in a puzzle.8
“Good science” is a broad expression. Philosophers involved in 
discussion on normal science have proposed different features of it. 
Kuhn suggested that he had dealt more with the problem of psy-
chological aspects, the way that scientists interact to reach conclu-
sions, scientists’ drives and values that lead them to work within 
the normal research conditions.9 Hence good science could be psy-
chologically rewarding motivating, interesting, and coherent with 
the scientist’s point of view, and convincing for the community to 
which the scientist belongs. According to a Popperian, intellectual 
point of view,10 good science should stand several rigorous attempts 
4 See J. Watkins, Against ‘Normal Science’, [in:] Criticism and the Growth of 
Knowledge, op. cit., p. 25.
5 See T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Fourth Edition, Chi-
cago–London 2012, p. 24.
6 T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, op. cit., p. 24.
7 T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, op. cit., p. 35.
8 Compare with T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, op. cit., p. 36.
9 Compare with T. S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?, [in:] 
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 21–22.
10 See K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Know­
ledge, London–New York 2004, p. 291.
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of falsification and refutation by observation.11 Good science would 
be objective rather than epistemic.12
2. Good “Psychological” Normal Science: Analysis
Kuhn’s account could be perceived as an attempt at explaining 
engagement in normal science on the grounds of motivation and 
reward. The aim was not a theoretical novelty. Research outcomes 
were clearly anticipated because they were provided by the para-
digm. Instead, another challenge appeared: solutions of unresolved 
problems within a paradigm with the use of sophisticated13 methods. 
The need for sophistication was necessary, as it provided scientists 
with challenges of genuine interest.14 In later discussions, Kuhn 
suggests that “it is the individual rather than current theory which 
is tested”.15 It can be understood as a further interpretation of the 
psychological aspects of science; not only does a scientist get attract-
ed to a problem because it is generally challenging as unresolved 
(thus being the goal shared by many researchers), but there also 
appears an element of ambition and even rivalry among scholars 
because of the introduction of a qualitative element; it leads them 
to compete as to whose solution is more sophisticated.
11 Compare with P. Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Science, Chicago–London 2003, p. 58.
12 Compare with K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, op. cit., p. 302–309.
13 “Sophisticated” is understood in this essay as a very widely comprehended 
“refined,” superior to prior attempts, because it appears close to Kuhn’s thought on 
problem-solving as “problems that can serve to test ingenuity or skill in solution” 
(T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, op. cit., p. 37). It is worth to 
clarify it, because “sophisticated” can also relate to “complex” and, as it has been 
pointed out by e.g. A. Baker, there actually is “a widespread philosophical presump-
tion that simplicity is a theoretical virtue” and a controversial discussion on the ex-
tent to which it is correct (compare with par. 1 in A. Baker, Simplicity, [in:] http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/simplicity/ (1.02.2013)). This discus-
sion, however, is not a concern central to the definition of good science proposed in 
this essay.
14 See T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, op. cit., p. 36.
15 T. S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?, op. cit., p. 5.
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Kuhn’s “psychological” scientific enterprise may seem intuitive-
ly appealing by showing a more “humane” side of research. Still, 
it was argued that “Kuhn’s use of […] the ‘puzzle’ was indicative 
of a wish to show that the problems so described are not […] very 
deep”.16 However, it is probable that Kuhn implemented the ex-
pression to indicate the mechanism underneath these problems, 
to emphasize their having a solution, like jigsaws do, not to assess 
normal science qualitatively. Moreover, Hacking has pointed out 
that (initially shocked) scientists admitted that Kuhn’s description 
indeed resembles their daily work.17
Kuhn listed attitudes as reasons behind engaging in normal 
science: “the desire to be useful, the excitement of exploring new 
territory, the hope of finding order, and the drive to test estab-
lished knowledge”.18 Such a personal approach seems subjective, 
inconsistent with one of suggested features of good science: objec-
tivity. Conversely, it could be argued that subjectivity may lead to 
a mutual advantage without colliding with objectivity in the wider 
perspective. In the aforementioned list of motivations, there is “a 
desire to be useful”, probably useful to the community assessing 
the paradigm implementation. A strongly motivated scientist 
contributed to methodological development (organizing knowledge, 
improved testing) that could be “the shared good”. It indirectly 
helped multiple members of the community, even if the drive to 
complete the “puzzle” was primarily to satisfy an individual.
Assuming that the research results have to be acknowledged 
by the scientific community suggests that, at least to some extent 
(perhaps people guided by the same paradigm), they are not en-
tirely subjective. The results are exposed to criticism to identify 
problems and hence bring them closer to objectivity (or at least to 
lesser subjectivity). That would imply that normal science is good. 
16 K. Popper, Normal Science and Its Dangers, [in:] Criticism and the Growth 
of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 53.
17 Compare with I. Hacking, Introductory Essay, [in:] T. S. Kuhn, The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions, op. cit., p. XVI.
18 T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, op. cit., p. 38.
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It rewards both scientists and their communities in some kind 
of bidirectional cooperation: the scientist has to be motivated to 
deliver useful results to the community but the community boosts 
their motivation and satisfaction by acknowledging their findings, 
which motivates scientists to continue their work and develop the 
paradigm scope which, in general, is the major community goal.
3. Problems with the “Psychologism” of Normal Science
Watkins focused on connections between normal science and the 
paradigm change.19 Yet his paradigm-centered critique illustrates 
the controversy surrounding the psychological aspects of normal 
science. The Instant-Paradigm Thesis was Watkins’ name for 
Kuhn’s idea from Structure… that inventing theories that are even-
tually crucial for a paradigm shift takes place at once, sometimes 
performed by a single person.20 Watkins considered an assumption 
of the religious-like21 dedication to the paradigm. He noticed that 
the new paradigm must have enough power to convince a scientist 
to completely change his or her thinking. It is improbable, Watkins 
argued, for an immediate result of work of a single scientist to be 
that strong.22
In light of Watkins’ insight, it may seem that normal science is 
psychologically complicated because Kuhn did not specify the extent 
to which scientists devote themselves to new theories underlying 
their normal scientific enterprise. In order to forward his paradigm 
criticism, it was Watkins who explicitly interpreted Kuhn’s rather 
vague remarks on, for example, how scientific training resembles 
orthodox theology23 the emphasis on individual motivation behind 
research. It would suggest that the main drive is actually “conform-
19 See J. Watkins, Against ‘Normal Science’, op. cit., p. 27.
20 J. Watkins, Against ‘Normal Science’, op. cit., p. 35.
21 Compare with T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, op. cit., 
p. 165. 
22 See J. Watkins, Against ‘Normal Science’, op. cit., p. 35.
23 T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, op. cit., p. 165.
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ing” to the community and the paradigm rather than individual 
acknowledgement. If Kuhn was right, then normal science could 
be considered as a high motivational factor for scientists, with its 
positive aspects of being rewarding and organizing scientific work 
to be accepted, hence “a good science”.
On the other hand, Watkins’ critique suggests a likelihood of 
normal science being disappointing, at least in crisis. Facing the 
research shortcomings and the possibility of their solutions being 
at least prior to the establishment of a new paradigm, scientists 
may incorrectly feel disappointment proportional to their earlier 
belief. Consequently, accepting Watkins’ view would yield for 
reformulation of the definition of good science by excluding psycho-
logical factors or maybe even by stating that normal science is not 
really good.
4. The “Intellectual” Perspective and Further Criticisms
In reply to Kuhn, Feyerabend asked “do scientists stick to their 
paradigms to the bitter end until disgust, frustration and boredom 
makes it quite impossible for them to go on?”24 This would support 
Watkins’ view. In a sense, however, Feyerabend went even further: 
“This is quite imaginable that scientists abandon a paradigm out 
of frustration and not because they have arguments against it”.25 
That critique would suggest that it is impossible for psychological 
reward and objectivity to be both features of normal science as 
there are cases in which the psychological (emotional) judgment is 
the main factor of scientific change.
That interpretation is in contrast to the “intellectual” perspective. 
Popper considered the lack of objectivity to be a problem, with the 
scientist being “a prisoner […] in the framework of […] theories; […] 
expectations; […] past experiences; […] language”.26 His solution was 
24 P. Feyerabend, Consolations for the Specialist, op. cit., p. 205.
25 P. Feyerabend, Consolations for the Specialist, op. cit., p. 203.
26 K. Popper, Normal Science and Its Dangers, op. cit., p. 56.
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the ongoing refutation of conjectures: “again in the framework, but 
[…] a better and roomier one; and we can at any moment break it out 
again”.27 He further criticized normal science for an over-dedication 
to community that limits the critical attitude towards the outcomes 
of research. Popper called normal science “indoctrination”,28 which 
evokes strong pejorative connotations. However, linking it with an 
earlier suggestion of a scientist relying on the community’s judg-
ment gives the possibility of forwarding a new critical point; perhaps 
a scientist’s attitude to his or her work in the process of completing 
said work is determined by the expectations of the community and 
tradition, not really how people “feel” but how they were “taught 
to feel”. That would expose a serious circularity of normal science: 
people engage in it because it is powerful; it is powerful because 
people are presented with that view at the beginning (and probably 
throughout) their academic career.
Finally, Popper criticized assuming the lack of novelty within 
the normal science. He pointed out that there is some novelty 
in the sciences that Kuhn would consider primarily descriptive, 
hence “normal”; such as in the case of a biologist who has to carry 
experiments on plants at every step of creating his descriptive 
classification.29 In short, “Kuhn, and perhaps others, was surely 
too focused on […] theoretical physics”.30 If so, then normal science 
could be considered “not good” not only on the grounds of outcomes, 
but, more generally, of its supposed mechanism.
Feyerabend discusses the pattern of revolution. According to 
him, the revolution did not really exist in a form “in which profes-
sional stupidity is periodically replaced by philosophical outbursts 
only to return again at a ‘higher level’”,31 meaning that the criti-
cism probably enters the normal scientific process earlier, not only 
in crisis (similarly, probably, to Popper in this aspect). Still, his 
27 K. Popper, Normal Science and Its Dangers, op. cit., p. 56.
28 K. Popper, Normal Science and Its Dangers, op. cit., p. 53.
29 K. Popper, Normal Science and Its Dangers, op. cit., p. 54.
30 P. Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality, op. cit., p. 98.
31 P. Feyerabend, Consolations for the Specialist, op. cit., p. 208.
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account offered more possibility for a psychological attitude, not 
necessarily “at the expense” of critical thinking, the impression 
Popper could have made.
Nickles suggests that Popper had “the grand, romantic picture 
of science as the field of play of artistic geniuses”32 with which 
Kuhn’s idea was fiercely compared (Nickles uses the word “over-
reaction”33). Feyerabend’s insight might seem more balanced. He 
argued for the possibility of having institutions organize the scien-
tific practice without restricting individual interests or talents. Yet 
to advance the development and articulation of ideas, an individual 
needs a community that is both open to novelty and defending the 
earlier ideas.34 Such a balance between the ideal and a critical yet 
practical version of science means reaching the positive aim that 
other philosophers leave unmentioned: happiness.
Conclusion
This paper has shown a variety of ways of understanding “good 
science”, and this influences the possible assessment of normal sci-
ence. It could be argued that the synthesis of Kuhn’s and Popper’s 
views is difficult as these views tend to contradict each other, each 
with its own advantages and disadvantages. Feyerabend’s attitude 
seems most balanced, but I think that the whole discussion shows 
a general problem. By introducing a rather “subjective” criterion 
of science, Kuhn and philosophers sympathetic to his thought 
have opened the way of ambiguous interpretation of science. The 
discussion developed into speaking of qualities that are important, 
but difficult to measure. Feyerabend has tried to outline a more 
probable, clearer mechanism than Kuhn but has introduced anoth-
32 T. Nickles, Normal Science: From Logic to Case­Based and Model­Based 
Reasoning, [in:] Thomas Kuhn, ed. T. Nickles, Cambridge 2003, p. 143.
33 T. Nickles, Normal Science: From Logic to Case­Based and Model­Based 
Reasoning, op. cit., p. 143.
34 P. Feyerabend, Consolations for the Specialist, op. cit., p. 209–210.
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er subjective criterion. That is why it could be argued that normal 
science will always remain a science with both “good” and “bad” 
aspects. Because of the margin of subjectivity its concept holds and 
somehow encourages, there will never be one clear-cut set of crite-
ria to apply as its goal or final ideal outcome, and, hence, normal 
science can be constantly criticized and praised.
Summary 
Is normal science good science? 
“Normal science” is a concept introduced by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (1962). In Kuhn’s view, normal science means “puzzle 
solving”, solving problems within the paradigm—framework most successful 
in solving current major scientific problems—rather than producing major 
novelties. This paper examines Kuhnian and Popperian accounts of normal 
science and their criticisms to assess if normal science is good. The advanta-
ge of normal science according to Kuhn was “psychological”: subjective satis-
faction from successful “puzzle solving”. Popper argues for an “intellectual” 
science, one that consistently refutes conjectures (hypotheses) and offers new 
ideas rather than focus on personal advantages. His account is criticized as too 
impersonal and idealistic. Feyerabend’s perspective seems more balanced; he 
argues for a community that would introduce new ideas, defend old ones, and 
enable scientists to develop in line with their subjective preferences. The paper 
concludes that normal science has no one clear-cut set of criteria encompassing 
its meaning and enabling clear assessment.
Keywords normal science, Thomas Kuhn, Karl Popper, Paul Feyerabend, 
scientific revolution
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